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The MoNTReAl CoNveNTIoN ANd The
PReeMPTIoN oF AIR PASSeNgeR hARM
ClAIMS
MARC MCdoNAld

INTRodUCTIoN
The aim of this article is to examine the evolution and present state of the law
governing the preemption of passenger claims for compensation for harm
arising from international air travel under the Montreal and Warsaw
Conventions. The direction of preemption law towards extreme or “total”
preemption of non-Convention actions for non-Convention harm in englishspeaking states was established in a series of last resort US and UK decisions
in the late 1990s and followed in other jurisdictions. Case law since has largely
focused on the working out of the consequences of these decisions. Some of the
consequences involve the denial of any cause of action for harmed air
passengers and appear questionable. A decade or so on seems an appropriate
time to take stock of preemption law to see, in particular, whether the present
direction of preemption law is legally sustainable or whether a different
approach or interpretation is required.
Part II of this article presents a descriptive overview of preemption law. It is
somewhat lengthy, both because of the complexity of the subject and because
of the scant literature on the subject. It assumes some familiarity with the basics
of Convention law. Part III traces the rise of preemption law, particularly the
triumph of total pre-emption, and lists the consequences of this. Part Iv
critically analyses the case law favouring total preemption. Part v undertakes
a de novo analysis of Montreal to see if total preemption under Montreal is
different from that under Warsaw and notes the likely influence of decisions by
the european Court of Justice (eCJ). Part vI summarises and concludes. The
overall conclusion is that total preemption of non-Convention actions for nonConvention harm is not legally sustainable.
deSCRIPTIve oveRvIeW oF PReeMPTIoN lAW
The general understanding in english-speaking states of art.29 of the Montreal
Convention1 on air carrier liability (Montreal) is that it excludes, displaces,
forbids or bans (preempts, a judicial, not a Convention, term) any national or
1. Formally titled “Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules for International
Carriage by Air” done at Montreal, May 25, 1999. Implemented in Ireland by the Air
Navigation and Transport (International Conventions) Act 2004, s.4(1), (2) and Sch.3.
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local (non-Convention) causes of action2 by passengers against an airline for
compensatory damages for injury or loss (harm) arising out of the international
carriage of passengers by aircraft.3 Article 29 is also understood to have the
same scope and effect (preemptive reach) as art.24 of the Warsaw Convention4
(Warsaw), its predecessor.5
The present text of art.29 (with significant changes from the original art.24,
italicised) now reads:
In the carriage of passengers, baggage and cargo, any action for damages,
however founded, whether under this Convention or in contract or in tort
or otherwise, can only be brought subject to the conditions and such
limits of liability as are set out in this Convention without prejudice to
the question as to who are the persons who have the right to bring suit
and what are their respective rights. In any such action punitive, exemplary
or any other non-compensatory damages shall not be recoverable.
The immediate aim of art.29/24 is to channel all relevant causes of action
against an airline through the Conventions and to ban non-Convention causes

2.

3.

4.

5.

Implemented in the european Union by Regulation 2027/97, oJ l 285/1, october 17,
1997, as amended by Regulation 889/2002, oJ l 140/2, April 13, 2002. The text of the
Convention is available at oJ l194/39, July 18, 2001.
Such as breach of contract and various forms of negligence based on failures to warn/
assist/provide care, including necessary equipment in working order, negligent or even
international infliction of emotional distress, fraud—Mbaba v Air France 457 F 3d 496,
2006 US App lexis 18663; wilful misconduct, intentional denial of medical assistance
and other claims for breach of statutory duty—Brandt v American Airlines 2000 US dist
lexis 3164; Turturro v Continental Airlines 128 F Supp 2d 170, 2001 US dist lexis 360;
Waters v Port Authority and Alitalia 158 F Supp 2d 415, 2001 US dist lexis 11790;
assault, battery, invasion of privacy—Brandt v American Airlines 2000 US dist lexis
3164 at 7; false imprisonment, conspiracy to commit false imprisonment, defamation—
Turturro v Continental Airlines 128 F Supp 2d 170, 2001 US dist lexis 360; slander—
Schroeder v Lufthansa 875 F 2d 613, 1989 US App lexis 7515; loss of consortium—Krys
v Lufthansa 119 F 3d 1515, 1997 US App lexis 22644; and bailment—Emery Air Freight
v Nerine Nurseries [1997] 3 NZlR 723.
Some US courts—e.g. Singh v American Airlines 426 F Supp 2d 38, 2006 US dist lexis
19745 at 9—have also considered as preemption the converting of a non-Convention
claim into a Convention one, but this, it is suggested, is a unique US jurisdictional
question related to whether to sue in a state or federal court. Further, most courts, when
dealing with preemption questions, have no difficulty in “converting”, if necessary, a nonConvention claim into a Convention one.
Formally titled “Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules for International
Carriage by Air”, done at Warsaw, october 12, 1929. Implemented in Ireland in its
original form by the Air Navigation and Transport (International Conventions) Act 2004,
s.4 (1), (2) and Sch.1 and in its amended form by Sch.2 of the 2004 Act. Amendments
derive from The hague Protocol of 1955 and Protocol No. 4 of Montreal, 1975.
For an account of preemption law in a general text on airline liability under the
Conventions, see Shawcross and Beaumont, Air Law, edited by J. McClean, et al.,
looseleaf, vII, pp.369–377.
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of action,6 thereby supporting the greater aim of ensuring global uniformity of
rules governing air carrier liability. Thus, in its various articles, which create
Convention causes of action—art.17(1) dealing with death or bodily injury,
art.17(2) dealing with damage, loss or destruction of baggage and art.19 dealing
with passenger delay—Montreal provides the only legal basis for actions for
damages by passengers.
The need for preemption
If Montreal/Warsaw (the Conventions) did not contain an explicit preemption
clause, such as art.29/24, some such clause would have to have been implied.
The Conventions’ aim of creating unified rules would have been thwarted if
states were free to allow non-Convention causes of action to be used alongside
Convention ones in situations covered by the Conventions.7 however, the
drafters of the Warsaw Convention were well aware when creating a new
liability regime for international air travel that they would have to address its
relationship with existing developing national or local law.8 Two approaches
could have been taken—defining the scope of Convention causes of action
and/or defining any residual scope of national causes of action. often, lawmakers in comparable situations define the former and leave the latter to be
determined by implication. With the Conventions, both approaches were taken.
Articles 17 and 19 establish, albeit vaguely, the Convention’s causes of action.
Article 29/24 defines the scope of residual non-Convention causes of action,
though the wording of both has always caused dispute, as will be seen, over
whether the language used was actually ambiguous and, if it was, how it should
be interpreted. It would not have been impossible to have devised a set of
words for total preemption (if that was the aim) along the following lines—“No
cause of action of any kind for compensatory damages, other than ones
provided under this Convention, may be taken in respect of any loss or injury
of any type, howsoever caused, arising out of international carriage by aircraft.”
Reasons why passengers try to avoid the Conventions
Preemption is only important because passengers try to sue outside the
Conventions. Under Warsaw there appear to have been five main reasons why
litigants sought to bring claims outside the Convention:
6. “It’s a very important stipulation which touches the very substance of the Convention,
because this excludes recourse to common law; originally, it was a separate article.”, UK
delegate dennis at 213, Second International Conference on Private Aeronautical law,
october 4–12, 1929, Warsaw, Minutes, trans. R. horner & d. legraz, Fred B. Rothman,
New Jersey, 1975 (“Warsaw Minutes”).
7. “Uniformity requires, however, that passengers be denied access to the profusion of
remedies that may exist under the laws of a particular country, so that they must bring
their claims under the terms of the Convention or not at all.”, King v American Airlines
284 F 3d 352, 2002 US App lexis 4611 at 6.
8. Warsaw Minutes at 176.
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• to avoid the low limits on the amounts of compensation awardable for
injury, baggage loss or delay where a claim falls within the Convention;
• to avoid the low limits which apply when courts give a broad meaning to
“embarking”9 and “disembarking” in art.17, with the result that a greater
range of injuries are subject to the low limits;
• to avoid the exclusion of claims involving internally originated or other
physical injury to passengers during normal air operations due to the narrow
definition of “accident” in art.1710;
• to avoid the exclusion under art.17 of claims for mental injury where there
is no physical injury11; or
• to avoid the short limitation period of two years which applies to
Convention causes of action.12
As Montreal replaces Warsaw, a number of these reasons may no longer have
the same force. The first-mentioned reason will no longer apply to personal
injury claims because Montreal contains no limits on the amount of compensation awardable. Indeed, since art.17(1) of Montreal now contains a
combination of conditional absolute liability up to a certain amount and
presumed fault liability for amounts above that, there are now no compensation
limits at all—features which make a Convention claim more attractive than
many non-Convention claims—and could even lead to airlines and not
passengers trying to avoid Montreal, most likely by claiming there was no
accident.
Further, there is now an increased awareness of other forms of passenger
harm, aside from death and bodily injury, mental injury and stress type harm
mainly focused on in-cabin treatment of passengers by airlines, which are also
affected by preemption. A list of these harms is provided in Pt III and it is the
focus of current concern. As and when mental injury per se becomes more
actionable under Montreal in english-speaking states (and especially in Ireland
and the UK by virtue of being subject to the jurisdiction of the european Court
of Justice as regards Montreal), another significant passenger reason for trying
to bring non-Convention causes of action will be removed. Already there are
signs that this may not be far off.13 Compensation limits still apply, however, to

9. Day v TWA 528 F 2d 31, 1975 US App lexis 11339.
10. Finally decided in the US by the Supreme Court in Saks v Air France 470 US 392, 1985
US lexis 62. See also Metz v KLM 1979 US dist lexis 8375—heart attack during a
flight was not an accident; Abramson v JAL739 F 2d 130, 1984 US App lexis 20346—
alleged aggravation of hernia injury not an accident.
11. Finally decided in the US by the Supreme Court in El Al v Tseng 525 US 155, 1999 US
lexis 505.
12. As in Burke v Aer Lingus [1997] 1 I.l.R.M. 148; Wolgel v Mexicana Airlines 821 F 2d
422, 1987 US App lexis 8033; Fishman v Delta Air Lines 132 F 3d 138, 1998 US App
lexis 23; Sassouni v Olympic Airways 769 F Supp 537, 1991 US dist lexis 10239; and
Seguritan v Northwest Airlines 440 N.e.2d 1339, 1982 N.Y. lexis 3686.
13. See Walz v Clickair C-63/09, May 6, 2010, and the discussion in Pt v of this article.
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claims for baggage loss and delay, so preemption remains important in these
areas, as it also does regarding the Convention’s short limitation period of two
years.
While art.29 is a significant source of Montreal’s preemptive reach, its literal
words have been held, as will be seen in Pt III, not to be the sole source of that
reach. english-speaking courts have adopted a purposive approach to art.29
with the result that other provisions and purposes of Montreal have been used
to help define its preemptive reach. For this reason, it is possible to talk of
Montreal’s preemptive reach without necessarily referring to art.29, although
art.29 remains at least a convenient figurehead.
Types of preemption
There appears to be two types of preemption—partial and total. Total can be
sub-divided into real and false total preemption, with the former used in the
case of aircraft incidents and the latter used for airport terminal incidents. It is
not clear if this further sub-division helps much. Partial preemption arises when
the facts of a claim fall fully inside the elements of liability of one of the
Convention causes of action. For example, with art.17(1) where there is a
plane-related14 accident and it causes bodily injury, there is no legal or policy
difficulty in saying the non-Convention claim is preempted; “partial” in this
sense means that the facts in a claim fully (and not partially) dovetail with the
facts required by a Convention cause of action. It is true the word “partial” is not
ideal as it might (wrongly) suggest that preemptive effect is less than full.
however, the use of “partial” is well established, especially in US jurisprudence.
Total preemption refers to the banning of a non-Convention claim where the
facts of the claim do not fall fully within the elements of a Convention claim,
either because the incident took place on board a plane but does not fit inside
all the elements of, say, art.17(1), or the incident arose outside the plane and
still does not fit inside art.17(1).
In addition to the preemption of non-Convention causes of action, there is a
range of other preemption issues associated with Warsaw/Montreal. These are:
• claims can only be brought in jurisdictions allowed by the Convention15;
• types of damages which are outside the purview of the Convention, such as
punitive damages, cannot be awarded16;
• recovery against a carrier is preempted to the extent that there has already
been recovery from the carrier’s agents or employees17;

14. This phrase is used as shorthand for on board an aircraft or while embarking or
disembarking. It is also used to include helicopters and other forms of aircraft.
15. Roberts v Guyana Airways (1998) 41 oR (3d) 653.
16. Re Lockerbie 928 F 2d 1267, 1991 US App lexis 4779. Since Montreal, the ban is now
explicit in the last sentence of art.29—“In any such action, punitive, exemplary or any
other non-compensatory damages shall not be recoverable.”
17. Article 30 (2). See Sompo v NAC 2008 US App. lexis 7834 at 9.
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• depending on allocation of court jurisdiction within a state, particularly
federal states, claims may only be heard in a competent court18;
• proof of recklessly caused damage with knowledge aforethought under
art.22(5) of Montreal only lifts Convention limits and does not allow nonConvention causes of action19; and
• state burden of proof rules are preempted by Montreal’s burden of proof
rules.20
This article will focus only on the first-mentioned aspect of Montreal—the
preemption of non-Convention causes of action.21 It does not focus on the
related but distinct preemption issue concerning domestic flights where a state
chooses to apply all or part of the Conventions to non-international flights, but
has the freedom to adopt variations of art.29.22 The eU law-maker has applied
Montreal to all domestic flights, including flights inside a Member State,
because it is “appropriate to have the same level and nature of liability in both
national and international transport.”23 Nor does this article focus on statutory
18. As in the US, although some federal courts still consider that state courts can hear
Convention claims—Rogers v American Airlines 192 F Supp 2d 661, 2001 US dist
lexis 17541; Serrano v American Airlines 2008 US dist lexis 40466; Nanki v
Continental Airlines 2010 US dist lexis 11879. In the eU, as will be seen, (where there
are no Community courts, except for the european Court of Justice and Court of First
Instance), Regulation 2027/97, which implements Montreal, must be litigated in state
(local) courts. In other english-speaking states, such as Australia and Canada, which
implement the Convention by domestic legislation (as opposed to constitutional
provisions, as in the US), thereby giving local courts the jurisdiction to hear claims under
the Convention, the issue of competing court jurisdictions and laws which “American
courts have struggled with”—Re Lockerbie at 9—does not arise.
19. Cases on predecessor, art.25 Warsaw, noted in Brandt v American Airlines 2000 US dist
lexis 3164 at 8. Under Montreal, see Booker v BWIA 2007 US dist lexis 33660 and 307
Fed Appx 491, 2009 US App lexis 523.
20. ICAo, International Conference on Air law (Convention for the Unification of Certain
Rules for International Carriage by Air), Montreal, May 10–28, 1999, vol.I, Minutes at
137 (Montreal Minutes).
21. Most of the cases cited in this article are US federal cases, most of which involved pretrial hearings where courts assumed facts alleged to be true for the purposes of the
hearing. This article likewise assumes the alleged facts to be true.
22. domestic preemption law, at least in the eU, has itself now been largely, but not totally,
preempted by Montreal preemption law, since the adoption of Montreal at Community level
(and its application to Community air carriers in the internal aviation market) “extends the
application of [Montreal’s] provisions to carriage by air within a single Member State”—art.1
of Regulation 2407/92 on the licensing of air carriers, oJ l 240/1, August 24, 1992. Under
this Regulation, a Community air carrier must have a valid operating licence. But under
art.1(2), certain flight activities are exempt from the need for an operating licence—“The
carriage by air of passengers, mail and/or cargo, performed by non-power driven aircraft
and/or ultra-light power driven aircraft, as well as local flights not involving carriage between
different airports, are not subject to this Regulation.” domestic preemption law therefore
continues to apply to such flights. See Laroche v Spirit of Adventure [2008] eWhC 788.
23. Recital 4 of the Preamble to Regulation 2022/97.
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attempts, not necessarily to create new non-Convention causes of action, but to
alter the conditions and limits under which Convention causes of action
operate, although it is clear that such attempts might, in certain circumstances,
be deemed invalid as being contrary to a Convention party’s obligations under
the Convention.24
Where preemption ends
Preemption under the Conventions has its limits. No matter how widely or
narrowly courts construe key Convention terms like “accident”, “bodily
injury”, “embarking”/“disembarking”, or “delay”, if passenger harm or delay
occurs outside these parameters and outside the Convention, a non-Convention
claim is not preempted by art.29/24 and can be pursued.
Instances of claims beyond the Conventions include those where there is a
complete non-performance of a flight contract by the carrier, such as where the
passenger never leaves the airport. Non-Convention claims in instances of this
kind are not preempted,25 though the distinction between non-performance and
delay (which is pre-empted) is not settled.26 Further, events inside the airport
terminal not proven to be linked to embarking or disembarking27—say, after
check-in and between the security check and the departure gate,28 or while on
an escalator in transit,29 or after arrival when released from airline control into
the public area of a terminal and taken into custody by airport authority officials,30
24. In R (IATA) v Secretary of State for the Environment [1999] 1 C.M.l.R. 1287, the
english high Court found that the interim Community measure (Regulation 2022/97 in its
original form) which in effect altered Warsaw’s compensation limits, amongst other
matters, was in conflict with Warsaw but was not invalid because its effect was in suspense
due to the fact that, under the eC Treaty, Community law did not affect pre-membership
agreements with third states. See N. grief, “Challenging the eC Regulation on air carrier
liability” (2000) J.B.l. 92. The issue is now moot since the amended Regulation 2022/97
declares that Montreal contains the liability rules for Community air carriers.
25. Wolgel v Mexicana Airlines 821 F 2d 422, 1987 US App lexis 8033; O’Callaghan v
ARM 2005 US dist lexis 12889.
26. Contrast Atia v Delta Airlines 2010 US dist lexis 18806 and Okeke v Norhtwest Airlines
2010 US dist lexis 17607. Further discussion of delay and preemption is beyond this article.
27. Kotsamabsis v Singapore Airlines [1997] NSWSC 303; Curran v Aer Lingus 1982 US
dist lexis 15937. A test of being linked with embarkation allows an expansive view of
embarkation so as to include pre-embarkation. embarkation is literally the process of
actually entering a plane. Although US case law is to the contrary, embarkation arguably
should not include any period when a passenger still has to go through a check or control
which could result in refusal of entry. The Australian judge in Kotsambasis said “there
must be a tight tie between an accident and the physical act of entering an aircraft.” Note
how Reporter de vos put the matter during the 6th Session of the Warsaw Conference
when reporting back to the plenary session: “The period of carriage commences
beginning from the time of embarkation of persons on board the aircraft” (emphasis
added)—Warsaw Minutes at 166.
28. Haley v Air Canada (1998) 171 N.S.R. 289; 1998 Can lII 1140 where the injury claim
was litigated through negligence and breach of contract.
29. Dick v American Airlines 476 F Supp 2d 61, 2007 U.S. dist lexis 19349. decision
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or while in the baggage pick-up area,31 or while returning to the airport to pick
up delayed luggage32— will all usually be outside the scope of the Conventions,
excluding events on the tarmac after an emergency evacuation.33
The widest parameter of the Convention’s application is that passenger harm
must be related to “aircraft”. Article 1(1) of Montreal says the Convention
applies to carriage by “aircraft”. Subject only to later Convention articles which
extend its liability reach to acts ancillary to getting on or off a plane and to the
collection of passenger baggage in the terminal, the further one goes from an
aircraft, the more likely that harm is beyond the Convention’s reach.
Most procedural rules and some substantial ones (relating to who can sue
and what types of loss are compensatable) are also beyond the Conventions.34
Claims by a passenger35or airline staff36 against a passenger, the airport,
police, etc proceed independently of the Convention, because both the text and
history of the Convention make clear that it deals only with claims against air
carriers, not anyone else. Claims against a carrier by its employees (or their
survivors) for employee harm during a flight while acting in the course of their
employment are also not subject to the Convention. Working carrier employees
are not passengers,37 although claims by non-carrier employees working during
a flight specifically organised for that working purpose may be treated as
passenger claims.38 Further, a claim can be brought under non-Convention law
against a carrier for harm the carrier procures to a passenger arising from police

30.
31.

32.
33.
34.

35.

36.
37.
38.

criticised (wrongly, one suggests) in case note g. Tompkins, “The Preemptive effect of the
Warsaw Convention and the distinction between the Applicability of the Convention to a
Claim and liability under the Convention for the Claim” (2007) Air & Space Law 226.
Turturro v Continental Airlines at 10.
Martinez Hernandez v Air France 545 F 2d 279, 1976 US App lexis 6147 where a
terrorist attack in the baggage pick-up area of the airport terminal was held to be outside
the Convention; Mac Donald v Air Canada 439 F 2d 1402, 1971 US App lexis 11128,
where a passenger fall on the ground in the baggage area was deemed to have occurred
after disembarking; Donkor v British Airways 62 F 2d 963, 1999 US dist lexis 12503,
where a loss claim arising from a possible failure to warn a transit passenger of the
possible need for a transit visa, independently of any airline delay, was regarded as not
being preempted by the Convention.
Fournier v Lufthansa 191 F Supp 2d 996, 2002 US dist lexis 2137.
Jack v TWA 854 F Supp 654; 1994 US dist lexis 2878 at 9.
In the words of the US delegate to the Montreal conference: “Since 1929 and to this day,
it had been up to local jurisdictions to decide such matters as which classes of persons,
which orders of relatives, what types of persons or non-natural persons, etc and what
elements of the measure of damages were.” Montreal Minutes at 189.
In Stone v Continental Airlines and John Doe 905 F Supp 821, 1995 US dist lexis 17840,
an unprovoked attack by one passenger on another was held not to be an “accident” because
there had been no act or omission by the airline linking it to the assault.
Rooney v Coutts, Irish Times, May 2, 2008, where it was reported that the Irish high Court,
in an oral decision, awarded €56,000 to an air steward who sued a passenger for assault.
Sulewski v Federal Express 749 F Supp 506, 1990 US dist lexis 13925.
See Herd v Clyde Helicopters 1997 SC(hl) 86, which, although involving a domestic
internal flight, was still decided under national law by reference to Convention principles.
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detention and search which takes place after disembarkation in a terminal
building.39
Claims against employees and agents of carriers
It is likely that claims, not against a carrier, but against its employees40 or
agents41or even sub-contractors of agents,42 are not preempted by art.29 of
Montreal,43 though under art.30 they are still subject to the Convention’s limits
of liability. however, the benefit of the limits of liability only apply when sued
by a passenger (or cargo consignor), but not by an airline.44 Some pre-Montreal
US courts have gone further and held that non-Convention claims against
agents are preempted and claims can only be brought if based on one of the
Convention’s liability-creating articles.45
The eMeRgeNCe oF ToTAl PReeMPTIoN
The rise of preemption
Preemption of non-Convention causes of action was not controversial for as
long as courts held or accepted, as some did,46 that Warsaw did not create its
own causes of action, but merely made the operation of non-Convention causes
subject to its conditions and limits of liability. Then it was actually necessary
to plead non-Convention causes of action in order to make a claim.
39. Schroder v Lufthansa 870 F 2d 613, 1989 US App lexis 7515, although on the facts the
airline was found not liable under local law for procuring the alleged false detention and
search of a passenger falsely accused of having a bomb.
40. Reed v Wiser 555 F Supp 2d 1079, 1977 US App lexis 13660. See also Singapore case
Seagate v Changi International [1997] 3 S.l.R. 1 at para.20.
41. Kabbani v ITS 805 F Supp 1033, 1992 US dist lexis 15898.
42. Waxman v Mexicana de Aviacion 13 F Supp 2d 508, 1998 US dist lexis 10572.
43. It may have been the intent of the drafters of Warsaw that no claims would be brought
against agents and that all relevant claims would be channelled through carriers. during
the 1929 Warsaw conference, when dealing with the cargo waybill, Reporter de vos
remarked that “in order that there be no erroneous interpretation, we have eliminated
everywhere the word ‘agent’. The words ‘consignor’ and ‘carrier’ cover the person
himself and any person who can act in his name by virtue of any kind of agency
relationship”—Warsaw Minutes at 157. however, the insertion of the predecessor of
art.30 may have frustrated this intent.
44. As in Sabena v United Airlines 773 F Supp 1117, 1991 US dist lexis 12023. Same
principle applies to carrier-on-carrier claims—Connaught Laboratories v Air Canada
(1978) 15 Av Cas (CCh) 17,705, where the ontario high Court stated: “none of the
articles of [Warsaw] regulate or purport to regulate claims of carriers one against the
other”, quoted in Sabena at 5.
45. Kabbani v ITS 805 F Supp 1033, 1992 US dist lexis 15898; Croucher v WFS 111 F
Supp 2d 501, 2000 US dist lexis 13655; Waters v Port Authority 158 F Supp 2d 415,
2001 US dist lexis 11790.
46. See Hasserl v Swiss Air 388 F Supp 1238, 1975 US dist lexis 13920 at 4.
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however, as it became accepted that Warsaw did create its own causes of
action,47 the question naturally arose whether, in the context of international air
transportation, non-Convention causes could still be used alongside Convention
ones (when the facts were within one of the Convention’s own causes of action)
or even instead of Convention ones (when the facts were outside one of the
Convention’s own causes of action). It was relatively straightforward and noncontroversial for courts to hold that non-Convention causes were indeed
preempted when facts were squarely within a Convention cause of action
(partial preemption).48 however, it was, and remains, more controversial to
decide that preemption also operates when facts are outside a Convention cause
of action but are still linked to international air travel (total preemption).
during this time, common law jurisdictions typically allowed any of a range
of causes of action to be pleaded in injury claims linked to international air
travel.49 Airline defendants contested this, claiming that the Convention’s intent
was to channel all passenger claims against airlines into one avenue, the
Convention’s own causes of action. Article 29/24 became pivotal in deciding
who was right.
First impressions on reading art.29/24 do suggest non-Convention causes of
action are not preempted, only channelled or conditioned. The phrase “however
founded” seemed to imply that non-Convention causes of action were still
allowed,50 subject to the Convention’s conditions and limits.
The alternative view of art.24
A second and different view of art.24 was also put forward. “The second
interpretation is that a plaintiff, whatever his damages, cannot circumvent the
Convention by bringing any action other than one under art.17.”51 This
expresses a broad view of art.24 and is not, it would seem, based on a literal
reading of the Article. A detailed discussion of the reasons for this view is set

47. Benjamins v BEA 527 F 2d 913, 1978 US App lexis 12288; Boehringer-Mannheim v
Pan Am 737 F 2d 456, 1984 US App lexis 20389.
48. See Re Lockerbie 928 F 2d 1267, 1991 US App lexis 4779. Some examples of cases
within the terms of a Convention cause of action where non-Convention claims were
preempted are Boehringer-Mannheim v Pan Am 737 F 2d 456, 1984 US App lexis
20389; Fishman v Delta Air Lines 132 F 3d 138, 1998 US App lexis 23; Paradis v
Ghana Airways 348 F Supp 2d 106, 2004 US dist App lexis 25238; Shirbokova v CAS
Czech Airlines 376.
49. As happened in a number of US cases—Krys v Lufthansa 119 F 3d 1515, 1997 US App
lexis 22644; Abramson v JAl 739 F 2d 130, 1984 US App lexis 20346; Metz v KLM
1979 US dist lexis 8375; Fischer v Northwest Airlines 623 F Supp 1064, 1985 US dist
lexis 12846; Tandon v United Air Lines; Walker v Eastern Air Lines 775 F Supp 111,
1991 US dist lexis 13402; Schroeder v Lufthansa 875 F 2d 613, 1989 US App lexis
7515; Re Lockerbie 928 F 2d 1267, 1991 US App lexis 4779.
50. Benjamins v BEA 527 F 2d 913, 1978 US App lexis 12288, see dissenting judgment of
van graafeiland J.
51. Re Lockerbie 928 F 2d 1267, 1991 US App lexis 4779 at 16.
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out in Pt Iv. Part of the difficulty in deciding whether art.24 required partial or
total preemption was that the english text of art.24 of Warsaw was not the
official text; French was, and disputes arose over the correct way to translate
various art.24 terms, such as “cas”52 (in the original version) and “conditions et
limits” from French into english. If “cas” was incorrectly translated as “cases” and
more correctly translated as “facts” or “situations”, this meant that art.24 had a
wide preemptive scope. The opening words in the original version of art.24(2)
would have been referring “generically to all personal injury cases stemming from
occurrences on board an aircraft or in embarking or disembarking”.53
one US judge plausibly suggested that the direct translation of “conditions
et limits” may also have obscured the drafters’ intent that art.24 was really
meant to have a total preemption effect and to allow only claims under arts 17,
18 or 19. The judge stated:
“In French, Article 24 states that actions ‘ne peut etre exercee que dans les
conditions et limites prevues par la presente Convention.’ … ‘Conditions’
has a number of meanings in French, including ‘the fundamental basis,’
e.g., larousse de Pouche 117 (1990), and if ‘basis’ or ‘terms’ are more
accurate translations, then Article 24 means that actions ‘however pleaded’
will be considered to have been brought on the basis of the Convention—
i.e., that the Warsaw Convention’s cause of action is exclusive.”54
There could be no such thing as remedies, only preemption. It was cause-ofaction preemption.
The preference for partial preemption
Until the 1990s, there was a long-standing divergence of judicial opinion in the
US regarding the actionability of facts related to air travel that lay beyond
Warsaw’s liability reach. Most judicial authority was in fact against total
preemption and in favour of allowing non-Convention causes for nonConvention harm.55 one US judge stated:
“The overwhelming consensus of the courts that have addressed the issue
is that an airline passenger may institute a claim under [non-Convention]
law for death or injury sustained on an international flight when an
[Article 17] accident is not involved.”56
52. Re Lockerbie at 16.
53. Tseng v El Al 525 US 155, 1999 US lexis 505 at 13.
54. Jack v TWA 820 F Supp 1218, 1993 US dist lexis 692 at 5. This judgment contains the
most detailed analysis of the pre-Warsaw drafting history of art.24.
55. As in, among others, Abramson v JAL 739 F 2d 130, US App lexis 20346 noting
previous cases; Fischer v Northwest Airlines 623 F Supp 1064, 1985 US dist lexis
12846; Re Lockerbie 928 F 2d 1267, 1991 US App lexis 4779; Walker v Eastern Air
Lines 775 F Supp 111, 1991 US dist lexis 13402.
56. Walker at 7.
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A variety of plausible reasons were advanced in the cases in support of this
position. These included:
• the lack of explicitness in the law on preemption—“Article 24 (2) of [the
original version of Warsaw] does not by its express terms limit maintenance
of actions brought under local law.”57
• the ease of drafting a total preemption clause if total preemption had been
the drafter’s intent—“it would have been a simple matter to preclude all
relief for other ‘unenumerated’ types of injuries; but no article to that effect
was incorporated.”58
• the words “however founded” imply that non-Convention causes of action
may still be used—“Article 24 clearly excludes any relief not provided for
in the Convention … It does not, however, limit the kind of cause of action
on which the relief may be founded; rather it provides that any action based
on the injuries specified in Article 17, ‘however founded’, i.e., regardless of
the type of action on which relief is founded, can only be brought subject
to the conditions and limitations established by the Warsaw system.
Presumably, the reason for the use of the phrase ‘however founded’ is
twofold: to accommodate all of the multifarious bases on which a claim
might be founded in different countries, whether under code law or common
law, whether under contract or tort, etc.; and to include all bases on which a
claim seeking relief for an injury might be founded in any one country … In
other words, if the injury occurs as described in Article 17, any relief
available is subject to the conditions and limitations established by the
Warsaw system, regardless of the particular cause of action which forms the
basis on which a plaintiff could seek relief. hence, [plaintiff’s] alternative
causes of action sounding in tort and in contract are perfectly proper.”59
• The words “subject to the conditions and limits set out in this Convention”
only “sets limits and renders uniform certain of the aspects of the relationship
… Thus, it would seem to follow that if the Convention ‘applies’, it applies
to limit—not eliminate—liability; if it does not apply, it leaves liability to
be determined according to traditional common law rules.”60
• The weight of authority, especially where no accident is involved.61
• The injustice of leaving a passenger without a remedy for an alleged
wrong—“I am very reluctant to assume, absent compelling authority, that
established [non-Convention] causes of action … have been extinguished in
cases where no other remedy is available.”62
57. Abramson at 6.
58. Husserl v Swiss Air [husserl II] 388 F Supp 1238, 1975 US dist lexis 13920 at 7.
59. husserl II at 6. For similar views about art.29 of Montreal see Serrrano v American
Airlines 2008 US dist lexis 4046 at 4 and Nankin v Continental Airlines 2010 US dist
lexis 11879 at 6.
60. Husserl v Swiss Air [husserl I] 351 F Supp 702, 1972 US dist lexis 11294 at 5.
61. Walker at 7.
62. Metz v KLM 1979 US dist lexis 8375 at 3.
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• The need for clarity before extinguishing prior rights—“Furthermore, the
[Warsaw drafters] must have been aware that to extinguish pre-exiting rights
their intent and expression must be clear; ambiguity or silence is rarely, if
ever, sufficient.”63
Together, these reasons present a formidable case against the banning of claims
whose facts do not match the elements of a Convention cause of action, both
because of what art.29/24 actually says and also because of what it was/is
intended to do. It would not have made sense to list all affected national causes
of action or to seek to describe how they were to be curtailed. Thus, it could
plausibly have been intended that a passenger could plead either a Convention
or a non-Convention cause of action, but that their resolution would be subject
to the conditions and limits of the Convention.
It is true that under such an approach there might be difficulty in figuring
out exactly how Convention conditions and limits would affect non-Convention
causes of action and there does not appear to be any common law judgment
giving definitive guidance on this.
Sidhu, Tseng and progeny
The arguments in favour of confining the Convention’s preemptive reach to
partial preemption only did not prevail. last resort courts in the UK and US
settled matters against allowing any non-Convention causes of action for harm
arising out of international air travel—total preemption. In Sidhu v British
Airways in 1997,64 and in Tseng v El Al in 1999,65 last-resort courts in the UK
and US respectively opted for total preemption, and this has set a trend. Citing
particularly Sidhu, courts in Australia,66 New Zealand,67 Singapore68 and hong
Kong69 have followed suit. In Nigeria, the position appears uncertain,70 while
in Canada, courts in partial preemption situations have approved Sidhu, but
there is no clear decision on Sidhu in a total preemption situation. A Canadian
judge stated: “What is readily apparent from this review of the case law is that,
at least in ontario, the state of the law regarding the scope of the Convention
is unsettled. [While partial preemption is accepted law it] is not, however, plain
and obvious that the Convention is exhaustive of all causes of action against a

63.
64.
65.
66.
67.

husserl II at 7.
[1997] A.C. 430.
525 US 155, 1999 US lexis 505.
Magnus v South Pacific Air (1998) A.l.R. 441.
Emery Air Freight v Nerine Nurseries [1997] 3 N.Z.l.R. 723; Vinotica v Air New
Zealand [2004] d.C.R. 786.
68. Seagate v Changi International [1997] 3 S.l.R. 1.
69. Ong v Malaysian Airlines [2008] hKCU 441.
70. See F. Majiyagbe and A. dalley, “The exclusivity of the Warsaw Convention Regime
vis-à-vis Actions and Remedies in International Carriage by Air under Nigerian law”
(2006) Air & Space Law 196.

216

Marc McDonald

carrier in respect of damages incurred during international carriage by air.”71 In
Ireland, Sidhu has been judicially noted but there is no binding decision.72
overall, a great deal of law now rests on the strength of the leading judgment
in Sidhu, that of lord hope.
Both Sidhu and Tseng involved claims for mental injury unrelated to
physical injury. In english-speaking states, such claims are typically regarded
as falling outside the facts of a Convention cause of action. In Sidhu, a
passenger was in Kuwait airport terminal during a scheduled stopover, awaiting
re-boarding on a flight from london to Malaysia, when Iraqi troops invaded
Kuwait, took control of the airport, and the passenger, as a consequence, did
not reach home until some time later. Sidhu and other passengers took cases in
the UK and the issue which came before the house of lords was whether they
could maintain a claim outside the Warsaw Convention for the mental injury
arising from their ordeal. In Tseng, the plaintiff, before boarding a flight from
New York to Tel Aviv, claimed that she was subjected to a wrongful invasive
body search by airline security personnel which caused her mental injury.
Neither Sidhu nor Tseng could show “bodily injury” or an “accident” as
required by art.17. Both sued outside the Convention. Both airlines resisted the
claims, arguing that art.17 provided the sole and exclusive remedy for
passenger harm and if a claim could not be brought under art.17 it could not be
brought at all.
Before outlining the courts’ reasoning in both cases, it is necessary to note
some of their preliminary features, which may cast some doubt on whether the
courts correctly identified them as falling inside the Convention. In Tseng, the
body search took place before check-in,73 but the US Supreme Court treated it
as an embarkation situation.74 In Sidhu, the detention of the passenger took
place inside the terminal building after disembarkation.75 Both locations are
typically treated as lying outside76 of the Convention’s reach.
however, the reason as to why both courts treated the claims as involving
Convention situations was that in both cases the parties agreed to have their
claim treated as arising from international carriage by aircraft77 (rather than
being outside it), thereby invoking (wittingly or unwittingly) the preemptive
rule of the Convention. This was perhaps not the soundest basis on which to
71. Kandiah v Emirates 2007 CanlII 23911 (oN S.C.) at para.23.
72. APH Manufacturing v DHL [2001] IeSC 71, at para.34.
73. See account of facts in first instance judgment at 919 F Supp 155, 1996 US dist lexis
3060.
74. Tseng at 12.
75. “The passengers disembarked into the transit lounge of the airport terminal”—Sidhu at
436.
76. Terminal “accidents” are typically outside the Convention’s reach unless closely related
to embarkation—Pacitti v Delta Air Lines 2008 US dist lexis 27046 and cases
discussed therein.
77. In Sidhu, the lords were able to treat the facts as raising an art.17 situation because the
passengers based their legal claims exclusively on “decisions taken while the aircraft was
in the air” and not on what happened to them in the airport terminal.
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rest an important legal analysis, as it leaves open the possibility that courts
might in the future avoid the rulings by holding on the facts that the parties did
not agree that the harm arose out of international travel by aircraft,78 or by
parties being careful to plead a cause of action based only on pre-embarkation
or post-disembarkation facts. For example, in France, by contrast, where, as
will be seen, the Sidhu incident was also litigated by French passengers (with
the minor difference that those passengers were in the airport hotel when taken
captive), the legal claim was not based on events in the plane and the Cour de
Cassation held that the facts were beyond the Convention’s reach. liability was
based and imposed on a French non-Convention cause of action.79
Nevertheless, the authority of both decisions is such that it cannot be
ignored and the analysis relied on in the two cases as supporting total
preemption needs to be stated. Much of that authority derives from the widely
quoted schematic analysis of the underlying purposes of Warsaw provided by
lord hope in Sidhu which is examined below in Pt Iv.
Both US and UK courts adopted broadly similar approaches to resolving the
same question, using a mix of literal, purposive, historical, comparative and
mischief techniques of treaty interpretation. each court decided (without much
examination) that the words of art.24 were not clear. According to the US
Supreme Court: “That prescription is not a model of the clear drafter’s art. We
recognize that the words lend themselves to divergent interpretation.”80 each
court then felt free to take a purposive approach to determine preemptive reach
and to construe other matters, such as the Preamble and overall scheme of
Warsaw, analyzing how its provisions sought to balance the interests of
passengers and airlines (balancing limiting amounts of compensation against
curtailing carrier freedom to contract out; widening the range of places to sue
against limiting the time period for suing).
The US court, perhaps, emphasised more the mischief which the Convention
was designed to deal with and the anomalies which would arise if total
preemption was not allowed. The UK court emphasised the significance of the
word “all” in art.1(1), the scope-defining provision of the Convention—“This
Convention applies to all international carriage of persons … by aircraft for
reward”—and also the inroad made into carrier freedom of contract. Both
courts also emphasised what many courts had emphasised,81 namely, a major
principle of the Convention was the desire of the Convention-makers to create
78. As happened in Acevado-Reinoso v Iberia 449 F 3d 7, 2006 US App lexis 12610,
discussed later.
79. Mohamed v British Airways, Cour de Cassation, Chambre Civile I, June 15, 1999, No
97–10.268, Bulletin 242, p.156; Cour d’Appel de Paris (1997) 51 R.F.d.A.S. 155;
Tribunal de grande Instance (1997) R.F.d.A.S. 147. discussed further below.
80. Tseng at 12.
81. Re Lockerbie at 7—“The Convention had two primary goals: first, to establish
uniformity in the aviation industry [and secondly and] clearly the overriding purpose—
to limit air carriers potential liability”; Boehringer-Mannheim v Pan Am 737 F 2d 456,
1984 US App lexis 20389 at 5—“An obvious major purpose of the Warsaw Convention
was to secure uniformity of liability for air carriers.”
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uniform rules to which all international air travel would be subject. In Tseng,
the US court uttered the much-quoted statement: “The cardinal purpose of the
Warsaw Convention, we have observed, is to ‘achieve uniformity of rules
governing claims arising from international air transportation.’”82 What both
courts did was to offer a solution to the question before them, not from the text
of Warsaw but from its purposes—as they saw them. A crucial step, common
to the reasoning of both courts, was to equate the general scope of Warsaw, as
set out in art.1(1), with the scope of its liability provisions as set out particularly
in art.17(1). If art.1 of Warsaw provided that the Convention applied to “all”
international travel by aircraft, what this meant, then, was that its preemptive
reach extended to all claims arising from international travel by aircraft, even
those not included in its liability provisions.
The arrival of Article 29
The replacement of art.24 of Warsaw by art.29 of Montreal did not lead to a
clearer set of preemption words or, as will be seen, to a change in preemptive
reach. during the Montreal Conference the wording was not seen as a
contentious matter and was not particularly discussed by delegates.83 The only
direct and not very illuminating statement on the draft art.29 was issued by the
conference chairman who stated:
“The purpose behind Article [29] was to ensure that, in circumstances in
which the Convention applied, it was not possible to circumvent its
provisions by bringing an action for damages … in contract or in tort or
otherwise. once the Convention applies, its conditions and limits of
liability were applicable.”84
Besides some verbal changes and condensing the two paragraphs of art.24 into
one, the only notable change made by Montreal for passengers and their
baggage was the insertion of “whether under this Convention or in contract or
in tort or otherwise” after “however founded”; “however” is already a term of
wide scope and arguably gained little by providing examples.
Whether art.29 signals a change from the preemptive reach of Warsaw has
already been addressed in a number of US cases. In light of the similarity of
language with art.24 it is not surprising that courts have said there is no change.
In the first case under Montreal—Paradis v Ghana Airways in 2004—a court
had to decide whether the possible preemption of a passenger’s claim had to be
judged under Warsaw or Montreal. The court decided that it did not matter. The
preemptive effect of both was the same. The change of Convention made no
difference. The court stated:

82. Tseng at 13.
83. Montreal Minutes at 111.
84. Montreal Minutes at 235.
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“Nevertheless, the Court need not determine which convention applies,
because they have substantially the same preemptive effect; Article 29 of
the Montreal Convention simply clarified the language of the Montreal
Protocol’s amendment to Article 24(1) of the Warsaw Convention. See
Article-by-Article Analysis of the Convention for the Unification of
Certain Rules for International Carriage by Air done at Montreal …
(describing Article 29 of the Montreal Convention as having been “taken
from” Montreal Protocol No. 4). here, the preemptive effect is identical
regardless of whether the Montreal Convention or the Warsaw
Convention (together, “the Conventions”) applies; thus, the Court need
not decide which Convention controls.”85
If the reach was the same then Warsaw case law would also apply to art.29.
Following Paradis, another US court stated:
“The court noted that the exclusivity provisions of the Montreal and
Warsaw Conventions are very similar and that ‘the preemptive effect is
identical …’ Thus, to supplement the scarce case law on the Montreal
Convention, this Court will look to cases analyzing the older Warsaw
Convention for guidance.”86
The prevailing US view to date (in the absence of any last-resort decision) is
that Montreal has made no change to preemption law, and pre-Montreal
precedent is applicable under Montreal. The addition of the extra words
“whether under the Convention or in contract or in tort or otherwise” after
“however founded” has not been held in most cases to mean that nonConvention causes of action are allowable.
Deprived of a remedy by total preemption
The position resulting from Sidhu, Tseng and their progeny (assuming for the
moment that Montreal has not changed matters) is a harsh one for passengers.
All claims for compensation against air carriers (regardless of the type of harm)
arising out of international air carriage must now be based on or mediated
85. Paradis v Ghana Airways 348 F Supp 2d 106, 2004 US dist lexis 25238 at 6. Relied on
in Igwe v Northwest Airlines 2007 US dist lexis 1204 at 6 and Weiss v El Al 433 F Supp
2d 361, 2006 US dist lexis 32563 at 6. See also, the comments of the legal advisor
during the Montreal conference to one of the airline trade bodies (IATA)—quoted in
Wetger J., “The eCJ decision of 10 January 2006 on the validity of Regulation
261/2004: Ignoring the exclusivity of the Montreal Convention” (2006) Air & Space
Law 133 at 136: “The drafters added the words ‘or in contract or in tort or otherwise’ in
Article 29 to make it clear that where [Montreal] is applicable, the causes of action for
damages created by [Montreal] … are exclusive of all other causes of action, whether
based on national/local law or any other law.”
86. Knowlton v American Airlines 2007 US dist lexis 6882 at 6. See also SchaeferCondulmari v US Airways 2009 US dist lexis 114723 at 5.
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through the Conventions or not at all.87 Many types of harm otherwise
actionable under local law are now, and will in the future be, non-actionable
and left uncompensated.88 The court in Tseng may have been aware that its
decision carried the risk that lower courts would shut out many claims because
they would not fit inside the Warsaw’s key concepts. It warned, firstly, that
claims not covered at all by the Convention could still be litigated under nonConvention law and, secondly and more importantly, it warned that the key
art.17 concept, “accident”, should be interpreted “flexibly”89—presumably to
lessen the risk of shut-out.
Since Sidhu and Tseng, some US courts have diligently applied the total
preemption principle and, in the process, produced some strange decisions.
They have analysed any passenger claim connected with international travel by
aircraft, even where no physical injury, property loss or delay is involved, in
terms of whether it fits inside art.17(1) concepts of plane-related, accident and
bodily injury. If it does not fit inside any or all of these, the claim is deemed
preempted.
This reasoning has produced (or would be likely to produce90) the following
results in compensation claims arising from international carriage by air:
On board/during embarkation or disembarkation (“real” total preemption)
• Airline causing mental injury unrelated to physical injury to passenger during
a search while embarking a plane,91 or during an emergency evacuation,92 or
while refusing to allow passenger and his child in different classes to
exchange seats because the child was in pain due to an earache,93 goes
uncompensated.
• Airline racially motivated selection of passenger for denied boarding inside
a bus bringing passengers to a plane for embarkation, goes uncompensated.94
• Airline wrongful removal of passenger prior to departure because of false
suspicion that he had a firearm, goes uncompensated.95

87. For a review of relevant US cases in the immediate aftermath of Tseng, see d. Westwood
and J. geraghty, “The Progeny of Tseng” (2000) Air & Space Law 62.
88. A case note on Sidhu—S. Phippard, “exclusivity of the Warsaw Convention” (1997) The
Aviation Quarterly 394 at 396, warns that Sidhu “if taken at its most literal, may give rise
to injustice.”
89. 525 US 155, 1999 US lexis 505 at 14.
90. Some of the cases below are pre-Tseng and were litigated as non-Convention causes of
action. Post-Tseng it is suggested this would not be allowed.
91. Tseng, fn.65.
92. Alvarez v American Airlines 1999 US dist lexis 13656, 2000 US dist lexis 1254.
93. Carey v United Airlines 255 F 3d 1044, 2001 US App lexis 14834.
94. King v American Airlines 284 F 3d 352, 2002 US App lexis 4611. See also Atia v Delta
Air Lines 2010 US dist lexis 18806 and Molefe v KLM 602 F Supp 2d 485, 2008 US
dist lexis 108910.
95. Hermano v United Airlines 1999 US dist lexis 19808.
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• Airline breach of contract during a flight by not providing a promised free
breakfast, goes uncompensated.96
• Airline defamatory statements on the plane’s public address that an “unruly
passenger” was leaving the plane and by the pilot on the plane to police
regarding the plane’s return to departure gate to let off a passenger suffering
a panic attack, go uncompensated.97
• Airline default in not preventing sexual assault by one passenger on another
on board the plane, probably goes uncompensated.98
• Airline discriminatory treatment of wheelchair passenger in not providing
appropriate “meet and assist” service on boarding plane and failing to assign
appropriate seating, goes uncompensated.99
In the airport (“false” total preemption)
• Airline causing mental injury to transit passengers by placing them in airport
terminal where they are taken prisoner by invading army, goes uncompensated.100
• Airline cancellation of part of a return flight while passenger awaits in
airport terminal, and when passenger books alternative flights after waiting
several hours with no assurance of securing a return flight with original
airline, goes uncompensated.101
• Airline intentional misrepresentation in the terminal to a transit passenger
about the closure of another airport to incoming flights from which the
passenger was to catch a connecting flight, probably goes uncompensated.102
• Airline fraud and deception during check-in regarding the size of excess
baggage fees payable by a passenger, goes uncompensated.103
96. Knowlton v American Airlines 2007 US dist lexis 6882. Noted by g. Tompkins, “The
Case of the Missing 3 dollar Breakfast and the Preemptive effect of the Montreal
Convention” (2007) Air and Space Law 229.
97. Turturro v Continental Airlines 128 F Supp 2d 170, 2001 US dist lexis 360 at 10.
98. This view is based on a combination of two decisions—the US case of Wallace v
Korean Airlines 214 F 3d 293, 2000 US App lexis 12245, where a passenger-onpassenger sexual assault was treated as an accident, and the UK case of Morris v KLM
[2001] eWCA Civ 790: [2001] 3 All e.R. 126, where another passenger-on-passenger
assault (caressing thigh) was characterised as a mental injury and not compensatable
under art.17 of Warsaw. Morris did not raise a preemption issue, as only a Convention
cause of action was pleaded.
99. Waters v Port Authority 158 F Supp 2d 415, 2001 US dist lexis 11790.
100. Sidhu v British Airways [1997] A.C. 430.
101. Paradis v Ghana Airways 348 F Supp 2d 106, 2004 US dist lexis 25238.
102. Hill v United Airlines 520 F Supp 1048, 1983 US dist lexis 9787, a pre-Tseng decision
which would probably be decided differently now.
103. Mbaba v Air France 457 F 3d 496, 2006 US App lexis 18663. For a case comment
criticising this decision for failing to hold that the case lay beyond the reach of the
Convention’s liability reach, see S. Mann, “Airline liability—The Warsaw Convention
—the Fifth Circuit rules that holding a passengers baggage for ransom is not actionable
under the Warsaw Convention: Mbaba v Air France” (2007) 72 J. Air l. & Com. 401.
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• Airline failure to prevent baggage staff in terminal, after passenger checkin, attaching a passenger’s name to a bag containing illegal drugs leading to
passenger arrest after disembarkation and imprisonment for nine months,
goes uncompensated.104
• Airline fraud and deceitful denial after passenger disembarked regarding the
making of a claim for lost checked baggage,105 goes uncompensated.
• Airline false statement from plane to ground crew that a passenger smoked
marijuana in the airplane lavatory which lead to passenger arrest and search
after disembarkation, probably goes uncompensated.106
The third last case in this list, Singh v North American Airlines, is a striking
illustration of the injustice of the present law. In addressing the plaintiff’s
negligence claim in relation to his arrest and imprisonment, the court examined
the claim as if it was a claim for personal injury under art.17. It held that the
mislabeling of the name on the drugs bag took place while the passenger was
embarking the plane (though the passenger never embarked with the drugs bag,
nor—if it came to it—was there any evidence of a time correspondence
between the mislabeling and the passenger’s embarkation). This finding was
enough to bring the facts within the Convention and the non-Convention
negligence claim was therefore deemed preempted. There is little doubt that
this reasoning twisted “embarking” into an almost unrecognizable shape and
highlights the absurdity of requiring that all claims must typically fit inside
art.17 or there is no claim at all.
given this state of affairs, it is small wonder that counsel in one case was
driven to assert: “An airline could, if it chose, even line up passengers on an
international flight and rob them at gunpoint without fear of any civil liability
to the victims whatsoever.”107 or, in another case, after hearing the plaintiff’s
argument that preemption would allow airlines to escape liability for
“egregious acts of discrimination” (even though the court surmised that some
104. Singh v American Airlines 426 F Supp 2d 38, 2006 US dist lexis 19745.
105. Cruz v America Airlines 193 F 3d 526, 1999 US App lexis 25354. Cruz tried to avoid
art.18 of the Convention by claiming to sue, not for lost luggage, but for fraud by the
airline in dealing with their claim of lost luggage. The court held the two claims were
so closely linked as to be indistinguishable and the common law claim for fraud was
deemed preempted. however, to illustrate when a common law claim would not be
preempted, the court added, at 6: “To be sure, if American's agent had hit Cruz with a
baseball bat when rejecting Cruz's claim we would not think Cruz's tort claim would be
preempted by the Warsaw Convention. Perhaps even a slanderous statement uttered by
an American employee in a heated argument over lost luggage would be actionable.”
106. Curley v American Airlines 846 F Supp 280, 1994 US dist lexis 2588, a pre-Tseng
art.17 decision, which would now probably not be litigated as a non-Convention cause
of action.
107. Mbaba at 6. The judge did not comment on this expression of opinion. In his case
comment on Mbaba Mann, fn.103 at 407, observed: “Taken to its logical conclusion,
this holding makes airlines essentially immune from deceptive trade practices actions
brought by travelling passengers”.
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acts of discrimination might constitute an accident under art.17), the court
stated: “the Convention already massively curtails damage awards for victims
of horrible acts such as terrorism, the fact that the Convention also abridges
recovery for the lesser offense of discrimination should not surprise anyone.”108
A wide range of other airline acts not yet reported in the cases might be
added to the list above—refusal on board a plane to provide drinks, headsets,
blankets or pillows, otherwise available, to a passenger, or directing passengers
to sit apart from others or providing incorrect information about various matters
such as immigration requirements, transit visas, reasons for delays, time of
arrival, connection gates and times, length of stopovers, alternative routes,
bringing a passenger to the wrong destination and causing immigration
difficulties109 and, generally, breach of contract claims relating to quality of
service provided on board. Since Tseng, these complaints would all seem to fall
to be judged by art.17(1) as if they were claims for bodily injury and, since they
are not, they will, in most if not all english-speaking states, fail. Passenger
harm in these instances is likely to be some form of mental injury or contract
loss, neither of which amounts to bodily injury.
There are occasional exceptions to total preemption, cases where the
particular facts enable a judge to say the case falls outside Montreal. In a US
case, Acevado-Reinoso v Iberia in 2006,110 a Cuban passport-holder with US
residency was wrongly told at check-in that he did not need a visa to enter
Spain. his subsequent state law claim against the airline after he was refused
entry, arrested and deported on arrival in Spain was dismissed at first instance
on the basis that, since he was engaged in international air travel, the case was
governed by Warsaw and his state law claim was preempted. on appeal,
however, the decision was reversed, the appellate court holding that Warsaw
did not apply because the giving of the false visa information occurred before
embarkation and the subsequent arrest and deportation occurred after
disembarkation. The root of the problem, according to the appellate court, was
that “the district court erroneously conflated the applicability of the Convention
with liability under the Convention.” In other words, the court disentangled
Convention-reach and liability-reach.
Persuasive as this decision might be, it is not clear that it will attract wide
support. It focused only on factually differentiating itself from Tseng and did
not address the wider legal arguments supporting total preemption.

108. Turturro at 10.
109. While a delay claim may be possible under art.19, it would not address the various extra
harms suffered if a passenger is arrested, detained and deported for not having a visa.
See the Nigerian case of Otutuizu v Cameroon Airlines (2005) 9 NWlR Part 929 CA
202.
110. 449 F 3d 7, 2006 US App lexis 12610.
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CRITICAl ANAlYSIS oF CASe lAW FAvoURINg ToTAl
PReeMPTIoN

The need for a critical analysis of Sidhu and Tseng
The list of remediless passenger harm in Part III demonstrates that total
preemption is harsh on passengers and lenient on airlines. Although aware that
there are limits to the Convention’s liability reach, many US courts since Tseng
appear either unable to see the limits or consider the Convention’s liabilityreach and its overall reach to be the same.
The present law derives essentially from the analysis in Sidhu and Tseng of
three central issues:
• lord hope’s analysis in Sidhu, based on art.24 and on the scope of Warsaw,
based the word “all” in art.1(1) and, on the balance of advantages and
disadvantages created by Warsaw,
• the fear of destablising the Convention’s compensation limits if only partial
preemption was allowed, and
• the view that uniformity requires total preemption of non-Convention
claims.
These issues will now be examined. A fourth issue—whether a purposive
analysis of Montreal produces the same result as the Sidhu and Tseng courts
analysis of Warsaw—must also be addressed, for the obvious reason that
regardless of whether Sidhu or Tseng were rightly or wrongly decided, a new
Convention requires a new analysis based on its own terms. Technically, Sidhu
and Tseng are not precedents for the interpretation of Montreal. The de novo
analysis is in Part v.
Lord Hope’s views
The key to understanding lord hope’s analysis in Sidhu is to identify the
approach he used to interpret Warsaw. When this is done, his reasoning and
conclusion are more easily seen. By disregarding the sources he examined in
his speech and did not find useful—the travaux préparatoires of Warsaw and
decisions of other courts (with the exception of the French litigation arising
from the same incident which will be referred to later)—and concentrating
instead on the sources he did rely on, namely, the text and purpose of Warsaw,
his analysis becomes more apparent. In dealing with these matters, lord hope
relied primarily on literal and purposive techniques of interpretation, which, in
principle, cannot be faulted. The somewhat subtle but key question, however,
is whether he got the balance between both techniques right; that is, whether he
paid insufficient attention to the literal meaning of art.24, and too much to the
policy he perceived to underlie it.
his preference for a purposive approach was discernible from the outset.
Near the end of his account of the case preliminaries (its history, facts and
competing arguments) he addressed the issue of how to construe Warsaw and
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stated that the english text of Warsaw “plainly is the primary source to which
we must turn for a solution to the point raised in this case. It may be
convenient, however, to record at this point that all parties were agreed, as they
were in the courts below, that the Convention should receive a purposive
construction.”111
Lord Hope and Article 24
What lord hope thought of the words in art.24 can be seen in the following
excerpt:
“The reference in the opening words of article 24(2) to ‘the cases covered
by articles 17’ does, of course, invite the question whether article 17 was
intended to cover only those cases for which the carrier is liable in
damages under that article. The answer to that question may indeed be
said to lie at the heart of this case. In my opinion the answer to it is to be
found not by an exact analysis of the particular words used but by a
consideration of the whole purpose of the article. In its context the
purpose seems to me to be to prescribe the circumstances—that is to say,
the only circumstances—in which a carrier will be liable in damages to
the passenger for claims arising out of his international carriage by air.”
The phrase “the cases covered by article 17” extends therefore to all claims
made by the passenger against the carrier arising out of international carriage
by air, other than claims for damage to his registered baggage, which must be
dealt with under art.18, and claims for delay, which must be dealt with under
art.19. The words “however founded”, which appear in art.24(1) and are
applied to passenger’s claims by art.24(2), support this approach. The intention
seems to be to provide a secure regime, within which the restriction on the
carrier’s freedom of contract is to operate. Benefits are given to the passenger
in return, but only in clearly defined circumstances to which the limits of
liability set out by the Convention are to apply. To permit exceptions, whereby
a passenger could sue outwith the Convention for losses sustained in the course
of international carriage by air, would distort the whole system, even in cases
for which the Convention did not create any liability on the part of the carrier.
Thus the purpose is to ensure that, in all questions relating to the carrier’s
liability, it is the provisions of the Convention which apply and that the
passenger does not have access to any other remedies, whether under the
common law or otherwise, which may be available within the particular
country where he chooses to raise his action. The carrier does not need to make
provision for the risk of being subjected to such remedies, because the whole
matter is regulated by the Convention.”112 (emphasis added).

111. Sidhu at 444.
112. See fn.111.
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What stands out in this remarkable passage is that lord hope never actually
considered, interpreted or analysed, either individually or collectively, the
words contained in art.24, the one provision most relevant to the question he
had to decide. he did mention two of its key phrases, but the first one he
addressed not by its literal meaning, but rather by its purpose in context, and the
second, “however founded”, he explained not by its meaning, whether literal
or in context, but according to his view of the intention underlying its use.
This represents, in this writer’s view, a quite inadequate analysis of art.24.
It is submitted that lord hope glossed over the meaning of the words in the
article. he failed, in the process, to identify the different possible meanings of
those words; he failed to identify reasons why one or other meaning might or
might not be preferred; and he failed to identify sufficient ambiguity in the
words to justify embracing a purposive interpretation. Furthermore, lord
hope’s speech contains no analysis of the US authorities on the interpretation
of art.24.
one might go so far as to suggest that lord hope ignored the legal obligation
under public international law to pay serious attention to the words used in a
treaty, especially when, as here, it is clear from the Warsaw conference Minutes
that over the four years of their work, the Convention-makers choose the words
in the Convention with some deliberation. There was also an added reason why
the Convention words deserved particular attention. Warsaw was a treaty which
purported to affect pre-existing national rights to compensation. It curtailed
some existing ones and created some new ones. Such a task would not—
indeed could not—have been undertaken by the Convention-makers without
great deliberation and careful choice of language.
So, against the backdrop of the always delicate question of how quickly a
judge should move from a literal to a purposive treaty interpretation and how
much ambiguity there needs to be before doing so, it is arguable that lord
hope moved much too quickly. The authority of his judgment is, thereby,
weakened as a result.
Article 1(1)
lord hope stressed the significance of “all” in art.1(1) of Warsaw, the provision
which states that the treaty applies to all international carriage by aircraft, to
support his view in favour of total preemption. he stated: “The word ‘all’ is
important, simply because it is so all-embracing. It indicates that the framers of
the Convention were looking for solutions … which could be regarded as
acceptable for universal application in all cases.”113 he drew a supporting
inference from the Convention’s liability rules, identifying them as a compromise between airlines and passengers. he instanced how art.23 (banning
Convention opt-outs) and art.24 (preempting non-Convention claims) seemed
consistent with the idea of an all-embracing, no-exceptions view of the
Convention.
113. Sidhu at 444.
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In considering the extent to which this approach was justified, one must
firstly note that there is an in-between area between “all” international travel
by aircraft and such travel where a plane-related accident gives rise to bodily
injury. Since the Conventions do not explicitly preempt local law claims in this
area, the question is whether lord hope’s use of “all” to suggest the
Convention is exclusive in liability terms is justified. Secondly, there are in fact
two indicators of the intent of the drafters of Warsaw as to whether nonConvention causes of action are or are not allowed in this in-between area:
where there is total non-performance by the carrier114 and where hand luggage
goes missing on board a plane. The latter is the more significant indicator of
intent because it occurs on board a plane. loss of hand luggage is as logically
intrinsic to international air travel as bodily injury. one would therefore expect
it to be a Warsaw issue, yet it is not part of Warsaw, and Warsaw conference
delegates deliberately choose not to create a Convention cause of action for it.
They treated it as subject to local law, but in accord with the principle of limited
compensation, made any claim (under local law) subject to a specific
compensation limit under the Convention.115 A peculiar approach, it might be
thought, but one which nonetheless clearly shows that conference delegates
wished non-Convention causes of action to continue to apply to an issue
connected with passenger harm on board an aircraft. While Montreal probably
does, now, create a specific hand luggage cause of action in art.17(2), the
significant point regarding preemption is that delegates at Warsaw, despite
envisaging that the Convention would apply to all international air travel, did
not envisage that all harm arising during international air travel would have to
be litigated either as a Convention cause of action or not at all.
lord hope’s analysis involves, in fact, the implausible notion that, if the
Convention-makers did not expressly allow recovery in the in-between area,
this was because they did not want recovery (under the rules they were making)
for the in-between area, and they also did not want recovery for the in-between
area under any local law either, even if such laws already existed (or had the
potential to emerge). Warsaw’s drafters wanted this important legal rule to be
identified, not expressly, not by clear and unambiguous language, but by subtle
inference or implication, which they surely knew ran the grave risk (which has
duly materialised) of variable interpretation by the courts.
lord hope also cited the careful balance of interests which underpinned
Warsaw and which would be disturbed by recognizing non-Convention causes
of action. however, it is far from clear how there could be a careful balance of
114. Warsaw Minutes at 76. Further discussion on this is appropriate to a discussion on
preemption and delay which is beyond this article.
115. Warsaw Minutes at 22 and 253. This was not spotted by the court in Kabbani v ITS 805
F Supp 1033, 1992 US dist lexis 15898, where the court struggled to decide how to
deal with theft from carry-on baggage temporarily taken charge of by an airline agent
during a terminal security check. The court eventually decided the theft would be treated
as if it was checked baggage but would be subject to the compensation limit for
unchecked baggage.
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interests when, as part of the balance, but unknown to anyone because it was
not mentioned in Warsaw’s Minutes, passengers were giving up the right to sue
for a wide and significant range of passenger harm.
The misplaced emphasis by lord hope on the word “all” reflects, it might
be said, a more than occasional tendency among judges to speak of the liability
reach of Warsaw/Montreal in terms of “international air transport” or
“international air travel” rather than “international carriage by aircraft”. The
latter phrase is preferable because it is less likely to lead judges astray.
Destablising the Convention
lord hope’s analysis in Sidhu did not rest only on the importance of art.(1). he
also referred to the fear of destablising the Convention and its liability caps if
non-Convention causes of action were allowed. Was this a legitimate fear?116
Both the Sidhu and Tseng courts felt it would destabilise the Convention,
because otherwise it would encourage “artful pleading” to avoid the Convention
and undermine Warsaw’s liability regime, especially its compensation caps, and
would cause anomalies.117
It is striking to note that no evidence was tendered in either Sidhu or Tseng
to show that allowing non-Convention causes would destabalise Warsaw. It
should have been possible to tender such evidence. For example, airlines in
both cases could have selected jurisdictions, such as the UK and France or
germany,118 or the US and Brazil, where different views apply on the actionability of mental injury per se under the Convention. Comparisons could have
been made regarding the impact on airline and passenger activity in each state
and an assessment made as to whether the differences had any discernable
effect, such as whether airlines were sued more often by passengers, were
found liable more often or paid out more compensation and generally suffered
greater trading losses or reduced levels of commercial activities.
Another comparison could have been made between differing federal
circuits in the US, where total and partial preemption operated. For example,
for three years, between 1996 and 1999 (the Tseng year), there was a clear split
of opinion between the Third Circuit119 and the Fifth Circuit120 regarding the
actionability under local law of non-accident injuries during an international
flight. It should have been possible for airlines to obtain international passenger,

116. Admittedly, the question is now academic, because such limits no longer exist as such
under Montreal. But courts still quote Sidhu and Tseng, so the question must be posed,
because its response is central to whether the Sidhu analysis remains valid and to
whether courts should continue to treat both decisions as authoritative.
117. Sidhu at 446; Tseng at 14.
118. See ICAo, International Conference on Air Law, Montreal, May 10–28, 1999, vol.I,
Minutes at 68.
119. Abramson v JAL 739 F 2d 130, 1984 US App lexis 20346. difference referred to in
Tseng at 10, fn.3.
120. Potter v Delta Air Lines 98 F 3d 881, 1996 US App lexis 29492.
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flight and other statistics for both circuit areas, to have made comparisons and
drawn, however tentative or imperfect, conclusions as to whether destabilisation had occurred. Further, the Third Circuit had taken this view since 1984,
and another comparison could have been made, this time between it and the
rest of the US, to see whether international passenger and flight activity and
airline profitability in the area covered by the Third Circuit had lagged behind
the rest of the US because its different view had destabilised Warsaw.
None of this was done. The Tseng and Sidhu courts assumed that destabilisation was a danger without examining it. In fact, common experience suggests
airlines do not differentiate in their operations between differing US federal
circuits or indeed between states, on the basis of how their courts view the
scope of preemption. Most likely, the Sidhu and Tseng courts fears of
destabilisation were more theoretical than real and, in the absence of evidence,
should have been discounted.
Uniformity and Preemption
Uniformity is a judicial principle of interpretation of Warsaw (and Montreal)
reflecting a supposed desire by Convention-makers to create a single set of
liability rules for all international air travel and to leave no claims outside that
set of rules, except when the Convention clearly says so. Uniformity was
centrally relied on in Tseng and Sidhu and, indeed, in courts before and since,
to justify the total preemption of non-Convention causes of action. There are,
however, significant doubts as to whether uniformity can carry the weight of
total preemption that has been imposed on it.
The most oft-quoted statement on the importance of uniformity was by the
US Supreme Court in Tseng:
“The cardinal purpose of the Warsaw Convention, as we have observed, is
to ‘achieve uniformity of rules governing claims arising from international
air transportation.’ … the Conventions signatories, in the treaties
preamble, specifically ‘recognised the advantage of regulating in a
uniform manner the conditions of … the liability of the carrier.’”121
Uniformity is said to support preemption, in that Warsaw’s Preamble cites as
its aim the unification of certain rules of liability regarding international
carriage by aircraft. The chapters of Warsaw express or record this desire in
specific ways. The value of these uniform rules would be undermined if local
rules outside the Convention were still available to harmed passengers. Article
24 deals with this risk by banning non-Convention causes of action for nonConvention harm.

121. Tseng at 13.
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Real and meaningful uniformity?
When courts refer to uniformity in the context of Warsaw and Montreal there
are only two types of uniformity they can be referring to. one is a shared desire
among Convention-makers to create common liability rules for all states—
uniformity of rules. The other is a shared desire to apply the rules in the same
way in all states—uniformity of interpretation and application. The first type,
uniformity of rules, was achieved when Warsaw was agreed in 1929 (and when
Montreal was agreed in 1999). each text represents the shared articulated desire
of State parties as to the areas they wished to address and the rules they wanted
to make. They are the only rules they unified. This means that uniformity of
rules was achieved, and has been achieved, for a long time, by the time of
Sidhu and Tseng. By the 1990s, uniformity was, by definition, a spent force, an
exhausted policy driver, no longer capable of supporting the making of new
rules and certainly not ones by judges who were not Convention-makers in
Warsaw.122
Some judges, however, seem to overlook this fact or, at least, use language
which suggests this. The passage from the US Supreme Court quoted earlier
uses the verb “achieve”—“The cardinal purpose of the Warsaw Convention, as
we have observed, is to ‘achieve uniformity of rules governing claims arising
from international air transportation.’” The verb “achieve” gives the misleading
impression that there is an on-going, post-1929 Convention purpose of creating
uniform rules which courts must act on. of course, the Convention says no
such thing. “Record” would perhaps have been a more accurate word to use. It
conveys more succinctly the reality that the Convention recorded the only
degree of uniformity that the Convention-makers agreed to. Uniformity cannot
give a mandate to judges to create rules that the Convention did not create.
Uniformity of interpretation
If uniformity of rules is not a permissible driver of Convention interpretation,
then even if they are not explicit about it, courts must be taken as referring to
uniformity of interpretation and application of rules. That is, they are
articulating a desire that the Convention-makers wanted their courts to interpret
and apply the Convention in the same way in all state-parties so as to ensure
that all facts produce the same legal outcomes.
Uniformity of interpretation and application of an international treaty like
Warsaw/Montreal, however, faces such formidable challenges as to be, in this
writer’s opinion, and under present circumstances, practicably unattainable. To
ensure the Conventions have the same effect in the courts of all ratifying states

122. See Jack v TWA 854 F Supp 654, 1994 US dist lexis 2878 at 9. See also J. Tyler in
Husserl v Swiss Air 388 F Supp 1238, 1975 US dist lexis 13920 at 6: “Although the
original motivation for establishing the international agreement no longer exists, it is
clear beyond peradventure that the [state parties] still adhere to the treaty's express
purpose; uniformity with respect to the liability of the carrier is still desired, if for
reasons somewhat different from the motivating ones.”
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would require the same degree of judicial discipline in an international context
as applies in a domestic one. This does not exist.
Consider the following:
1.

2.

3.

Neither Warsaw nor Montreal contain any mechanism for ensuring their
consistent and universal interpretation and application. There is no (and
there never has been) a Montreal or ICAo court which can be referred to
for binding rulings on the interpretation of the Conventions.123 An Irish
judge remarked in this regard that “(t)here is no system of reference of
questions of interpretation for rulings to bind the courts of the contracting
states as there is under the Treaty establishing the european Community.”124
The fact that Montreal now comes as authentic in six languages poses
entirely new challenges of interpretation. These challenges were already
daunting with one official language under Warsaw (witness the trauma
which the two words “leison corporelle” have caused in english-speaking
states). With six, all of equal validity, the risk of differing interpretation is
much greater,125 although at least in the eU the Court of Justice has much
experience in resolving linguistic differences in legal texts.126 Already,
during the conference preceding Montreal, the challenge of ensuring
linguistic equivalence across all versions of Montreal was apparent.127
The practical difficulties in ensuring uniformity of interpretation are
formidable. Case law is the only way of elucidating the meaning of the
Convention. however, there are jurisdictions which do not approve of
judges looking at other cases, preferring instead that the judge look only at
the Convention.128 Typically, the most that can be expected is that references
will be made to foreign courts with similar linguistic and legal cultures.129

123. The International Court of Justice in The hague may be available in an inter-state
dispute over Montreal.
124. APH Manufacturing v DHL [2001] IeSC 71 at para.32. Nor is there an official database
of, say, decisions of last resort, let alone higher-level courts, of State parties to the
Conventions. If such existed it would have to be in all of the official languages of
Montreal—english, Arabic, Chinese, French, Russian and Spanish.
125. According to Cheng B, “A New era in the law of International Carriage by Air: from
Warsaw to Montreal” (2004) I.C.l.Q. 833 at 856: “The six equally authentic texts,
without any prevailing text in case of inconsistency, can prove a veritable Aladdin's cave
for all the litigants, encourage litigation, and produce conflicting applications … There
is much to be said for one of the texts to be given priority in case of inconsistency,
notwithstanding national pride.”
126. easyCar v Office of Fair Trading, C-336/03, [2005] e.C.R. I-1947.
127. See Montreal Minutes at 59, 67, 69, 97, 103 and 220.
128. According to the French delegate at Montreal, requiring courts to take account of preMontreal jurisprudence “would constitute an attack on the separation of powers …
Judges must be free to take their decisions on the basis of the Convention itself, without
having earlier jurisprudence imposed on them”, Montreal Minutes at 220.
129. historically, this is what has largely happened in english-speaking states (with the
exception of references to French and some other courts, because French was the only
authentic language of Warsaw. See e.g. Ehrlich v American Airlines 360 F 3d 366, 2004
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There is, in effect, a linguistic “box” which significantly hinders crosslanguage referencing to foreign court interpretations of the Conventions.
At best, what may exist is a mere possibility of uniformity of interpretation
across similar language states.
Further, as and when courts do choose to look outside their “linguistic
box”, various factors and reasons can be found for disregarding the foreign
decision or interpretation. Sidhu itself provides a good example of this. To
briefly recap the facts: a French first instance court130 treated the capture
of a passenger (in an airport hotel, rather than in the terminal) by an
invading army during a flight stop-over as actionable under a nonConvention cause of action because the disembarking had finished at the
relevant time. The house of lords paid little attention to this decision.
lord hope noted that it was a first instance decision, and the judgment
“does not contain a close analysis of the Convention, nor is there any
reference to previous decisions on the issue in the French courts or
elsewhere. The reasons given do not disclose a detailed examination of the
issues raised by the defence.”131
What transpired in France following the observations of lord hope in
Sidhu is revealing. As he himself noted in his speech, the French decision
was, at the time, under appeal.132 The inference to be drawn from this was
that the appellate court could well adopt a more rigorous approach. In fact,
the court upheld the decision of the Tribunal de grande Instance,133 and
this in turn was upheld on appeal by France’s highest civil court, the Cour
de Cassation. None of the French appellate decisions engaged in the kind
of analysis of Warsaw’s purpose, history and case-law that lord hope
engaged in. Clearly, the French courts did not regard this as necessary. Nor
did either of the French appellate courts refer to Sidhu or Tseng or even,
for that matter, to previous French decisions.
The law as it developed in english-speaking jurisdictions following the
French litigation is also instructive. Courts in other english-speaking states
US App lexis 4403 at 19 where, under the heading “Judicial decisions of Sister
Signatories”, the court referred to decisions in Australia and the UK, only the latter of
which was a party to the original Warsaw Convention.
See fn.79 for French case references.
Sidhu fn.64 at 453.
Although the first French appeal decision was given on November 12, 1996, that is,
between the end of the house of lords hearing on october 16, 1996 and the court
judgment delivered on december 12, 1996.
The difference between the French and UK approaches (“fondamentalemant different”)
was noted in an oddly-timed and largely descriptive account of Sidhu and Mohamed by
de e. Montlaur- Martin, “la Convention de varsovie exclut-elle toute action de droit
common en domages-interets? Consequences des disparities de la jurisprudence au
Royaume-Uni et en France sur l’indemnisation des otages du Koweit” (1997)
R.F.d.A.S. 253. The article appeared before the Cour de Cassation decision and
between the decisions of the Second US Circuit Court of Appeal and the US Supreme
Court in Tseng.
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have continued to cite Sidhu as authoritative,134 but not one of them has
cited or examined the outcome of the French litigation and clearly did not
regard doing so as being in any way relevant, either to uniformity of
interpretation generally, or to the law on total preemption in particular. It
is a striking example of the linguistic box in operation and of the
impossibility of uniformity of interpretation.
Moreover, Montreal now authorises non-uniform interpretation. When
states could not, after much deliberation,135 agree at the conference
preceding Montreal on making an alteration to the phrase “bodily injury”
so as to make mental injury on its own actionable, the following statement
was adopted by the conference:
“the expression ‘bodily injury’ is included on the basis of the fact that
in some States damages for mental injuries are recoverable under
certain circumstances, that jurisprudence in this area is developing and
that it is not intended to interfere with this development …”136

This is nothing less than a recipe, an official recipe, for non-uniform interpretation of Montreal. States which, before Montreal, interpreted bodily injury
as encompassing mental injury per se may continue to do so, while states which
did not do so may also continue to do so.137 This constitutes a clear acceptance
by the Convention-makers that under Warsaw there was no uniformity of
interpretation of a key liability issue and that under Montreal there will also be
none.138
134.
135.
136.
137.

See cases mentioned at fnn.66–69.
Montreal Minutes, e.g. at 68–80.
Montreal Minutes at 243.
As in Canada, see Plourde v Service Aérien FBO (Skyservice) 2007 QCCA 739, where
the court held that Montreal made no change on the Warsaw position.
138. other examples of lack of uniformity of interpretation include: according to S. gates,
“The New International Passenger liability Regime” (1997) I.I.l.R. 123 at 125: “At the
one end of the scale, the death of a Japanese passenger on an aircraft appears
axiomatically to amount to wilful misconduct [under Article 25 of Warsaw] on the part
of the carrier and at the other end of the scale, the most rigorous tests are applied in the
United Kingdom in determining wilful misconduct ... In France the Convention is
presently non-exclusive, in the United Kingdom it is exclusive and in the United States
it may be.” According to J. Wetger, “The eCJ decision of 10 January 2006 on the
validity of Regulation 261/2004: Ignoring the exclusivity of the Montreal Convention”
(2006) Air & Space Law 133 at 135: “civil law jurisdictions in latin America … do not
apply the exclusivity arguments of Sidhu and Tseng”. Note also that objects falling from
an opened overhead bin and injuring a passenger underneath is an “accident” under
art.17 in the US (according to Maxwell v Aer Lingus 122 F Supp 2d 210, 2000 US dist
lexis 17206) but not a bag falling while being put into an overhead bin in the
Netherlands (decision of Amsterdam Court of Appeal, August 28, 2003, SeS 2004, 56
cited in h. Manuel, “The Montreal Convention in the european Context: A Passenger’s
Paradise?”, conference paper presented at First IFTTA europe Workshop, Budapest
2008.
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Summarising the analysis of Sidhu and Tseng
To summarise the analysis of the legal reasoning used in Sidhu and Tseng on
total preemption of non-Convention causes of action—the facts on which total
preemption can be found can, in some cases, be readily avoided—there was a
significant lack of balance in the choice of interpretive techniques used by lord
hope in his analysis in Sidhu, there was insufficient attention paid to the words
used in art.24, his emphasis on “all” in art.1(1) was misplaced, the Convention
destabilization argument was never proven, and the principle of uniformity
cannot support total preemption because uniformity of rules has been achieved
and uniformity of interpretation is a practical impossibility.
DE NOVO ANAlYSIS oF MoNTReAl
The analysis in Sidhu and Tseng was based on the Warsaw Convention only.
Warsaw is gradually being replaced by Montreal, a separate and distinct legal
instrument. Total preemption as deduced from Warsaw does not necessarily
mean the same for Montreal. The fact that some US courts, though not the US
Supreme Court, have decided that the preemptive reach of both Conventions is
the same139 does not necessarily mean that they are correct or render a de novo
analysis of Montreal unnecessary. The US courts in question considered
themselves bound by the precedent of Tseng’s Warsaw analysis.
The question which must now be posed is whether a purposive analysis of
Montreal, akin to that of lord hope in Sidhu, reveals the same desire to deny
airline liability under non-Convention law for non-Convention harm, that is, in
the in-between area between all passenger harm suffered during international
air travel and the limited passenger harm actionable under art.17.
This analysis must be conducted under arts 31 and 32 of the vienna
Convention on the law of Treaties,140 which sets out how a treaty should be
interpreted. one must also bear in mind the interpretive approach of the
european Court of Justice in the european Union, as it is this court that now
has the final say on how Montreal is to be interpreted.141 In its decisions so far
on Montreal,142 the court has engaged in a close textual analysis of key terms
on their own and in context and also in different languages. It has also relied on
the aims of Montreal as set out in its Preamble and referred to the balance of

139. See fnn.85 and 86 above. Supported by academic comment: see d. Westwood and J.
geraghty, fn.87 at 72.
140. United Nations, Treaty Series, vol.1155, p.331, especially arts 31 and 32. Warsaw predated this and was not subject to it, but to its un-codified equivalent.
141. due to the adoption of Montreal by the eU as a binding legal instrument in Regulation
2027/97, oJ l 285/1, october 17, 1997, as amended by Regulation 889/2002, oJ l
140/2, April 13, 2002.
142. See R (IATA) v Department of Transport C–344/04, [2006] e.C.R. I–403; WallintinHermann v Alitalia C–549/07, [2008] e.C.R. I-11061 and Walz v Clickair C–63/09,
May 6, 2010.
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interests underpinning Montreal. The aim of the present analysis is to search
for possible clues one way or the other in the text, Preamble, policies and
travaux preparatoires of Montreal for an underlying purpose or intent regarding
total preemption.
The backdrop to Montreal
The mischief technique of interpretation allows one to identify underlying
purposes by referring to the prior problems that a new law is designed to
address. The backdrop to the conference preceding Montreal is evident from
the conference Minutes.143 The Warsaw system had become fragmented; intercarrier agreements were supplanting Warsaw in important respects; the introduction of electronic ticketing was being slowed down by Warsaw insistence
on paper tickets: and compensation caps were too low to provide fair
compensation to passengers.
Responding to these concerns, the Montreal Preamble specifically recognises
“the importance of ensuring the protection of the interests of consumers” as
well as “the need for the equitable compensation of passengers in accordance
with the principle of restitution” (more of which later). linking Warsaw to
Montreal, the Preamble expresses the desirability of “an orderly development
of international air transport operations.” It is noteworthy that uniformity of
interpretation is not mentioned as an aim of the Convention, although the
unification of rules is mentioned as the ultimate objective. The Montreal
Preamble records the Convention-makers’ belief that the rules they were
making represent “the most adequate means of achieving an equitable balance
of interests” between the affected parties. on foot of this, certain balances of
interest mentioned by lord hope remain valid. Carriers are not allowed to
exclude any of the Convention’s provisions, and passengers are not allowed to
sue outside the Convention for harm covered by the Convention. equally,
passengers must accept a shorter limitation period for suing, but, on the other
hand, have a greater range of jurisdictions in which to sue.
Montreal’s changes
Beyond these specific balances, the general balance of interests under Montreal
is significantly different and seems to clearly favour passengers. In establishing
a conditional form of absolute liability for carriers on claims up to 100,000
SdRs,144 combined with a reversal of the burden of proof for amounts above
this, there is recognition of the obvious dangers to passengers of commercial
flying. In the removal of compensation limits there is recognition of the need
for full recovery.
143. See fn.20.
144. An SdR is a reserve asset used by the International Monetary Fund and exchangeable
against currencies. See http://www.imf.org/external/np/exr/facts/sdr.htm [last Accessed
August 21, 2010]. The figure of 100,000 was recently increased to 113,100 by the Air
Navigation and Transport (International Conventions) Act 2004 (Revision of limits of
liability) order (S.I. No. 390 of 2010).
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These are radical changes from Warsaw which can be seen as reflective of
the principle of restitution mentioned in Montreal’s, and not Warsaw’s,
Preamble. They consign to history a major aim of Warsaw, namely, the
protection of a fledgling industry from disastrous litigation and unsustainable
insurance costs. They also suggest the makers of Montreal were not afraid of
the financial impact of the changes being made on the airline industry. This
could be a telling indicator of underlying intent as regards total preemption.
The sole recognition of carrier interest is that absolute liability for bodily injury
is still conditional on there being a plane-related accident causing bodily injury.
of further note is that the new compensation rules under Montreal (as
regards bodily injuries) are now likely to be at least, if not more, attractive to
injured passengers than non-Convention ones. This also suggests a lack of fear
about the financial impact on airlines, which in turn would allow the use of
non-Convention causes of action for non-personal injuries.
Article 1(1) is unchanged
however, the indicators in Warsaw that State parties intended a wide coverage
for the Convention are also present in Montreal. Article 1(1) reiterates that the
Convention applies to all international carriage by aircraft.145 Further, while the
balance of interests’ argument under Montreal is more favourable to passengers
for personal injury claims, this is not the case for harm to passenger property.
The Warsaw balance for checked baggage remains undisturbed, albeit updated,
while for passenger hand luggage one might even say the balance is struck
more in favour of the airline. In addition, by creating for the first time a
Convention cause of action for loss of hand luggage, it can be said that this
reinforces a desire to ensure that Montreal provides the sole legal remedy for
all passenger harm.
Article 29 is different
Two further points are important, and may even be decisive in the discussion.
Since english is now an official Convention language, the interpretation of
art.29 need no longer be bedeviled as to whether its terms are accurate
translations from French. There is, therefore, no longer any excuse for ignoring
its plain terms and, as regards those terms, there is no gainsaying that art.29 is
now a different article from art.24. The inclusion of new words “in contract or
in tort or otherwise” in art.29 appears to more openly and unambiguously
acknowledge that non-Convention actions “in contract or in tort or otherwise”
can indeed be brought for Convention harm, albeit subject to Montreal’s
conditions and limits. These extra words might be seen as compounding the
unhappy experience with the phrase “however caused”, but they would have
been a strange choice if total preemption was the aim. More direct language

145. Supported by art.2, which includes flights by states, and art.57, which includes certain
non-commercial state flights and even certain military flights.
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(like “no action for harm arising from international carriage by aircraft can be
brought outside the Convention”) would have been appropriate for total
preemption.
Restitution and preemption
Courts must now interpret Montreal in accordance with the principle of
restitution. This follows from its inclusion as an explicit Preamble principle.
Restitution is a somewhat vague concept which is not defined by Montreal. Yet,
some matters seem clear. It is an equitable concept applicable here to restoring
consumer loss and is based on fairness and justice. Unless its impact is
specifically described in a legal text, it requires a case-by-case analysis of facts
to determine its application. It finds its clearest expression in art.17 of Montreal
in the altered liability rules for bodily injury. Nonetheless, by virtue of being an
explicit Preamble principle, it must also be applied to all relevant issues of the
interpretation of Montreal, especially those involving ambiguities, including,
in this instance, the scope of preemption.
What follows from this seems reasonably clear. denying compensation for
plane-related non-accident and/or non-bodily injury passenger harm, which
results from a deliberate or careless act or omission of an airline and which
would be actionable if it happened elsewhere, can hardly be regarded as
consistent with the principle of restitution. It is arguably the inverse. Passenger
harm is left un-restituted.
The ECJ and non-material damage
A recent decision by the european Court of Justice (eCJ) on the interpretation
of Montreal may suggest that the day is not far off when total preemption may
loose much of its impact as regards claims for mental injury per se. While the
eCJ has not directly addressed the question of whether “bodily injury” in
art.17(1) encompasses mental injury, in Walz v Clickair,146 the court held that
the word “damage” must be given the same meaning in all of Ch.III of
Montreal (the liability rules chapter). It specifically held that in art.22(2)
(dealing with claims for lost or damaged checked baggage) damage includes
non-material as well as material damage. It is not a big step from this to hold
that “bodily injury” also includes non-material damage.
For the foregoing reasons, it is suggested that an analysis of Montreal should
result in a different outcome to that of a purposive analysis of Warsaw. The
principle of restitution is the key difference. Restituting harmed passengers is
very different from protecting airlines against full harm recovery. Restitution
suggests that the purposive analysis used by lord hope in Sidhu cannot apply
to Montreal and that a different analysis is required. US judges who have
deemed the preemptive reach of Warsaw and Montreal to be the same have not
paid enough attention to the principle of restitution.

146. Walz v Clickair C-63/09, May 6, 2010.

238

Marc McDonald
CoNClUSIoN

The view of some US judges that the change from Warsaw to Montreal has
made no difference to the standing of the principle of total preemption is, it is
suggested, incorrect. The purpose of Montreal is significantly different from
the purpose of Warsaw, even if many of the key concepts remain unchanged.
The new principle of restitution most likely requires the interpretation of
ambiguous Convention language (if art.29 is indeed ambiguous) so as to ensure
passengers are not denied access to causes of action, whether Convention or
non-Convention.
The triumph of total preemption in english-speaking states, which has led
to wrongs being left without a remedy, may be short-lived. The assumption by
the eCJ of last-resort jurisdiction on the interpretation of Montreal for the
entire european Union is likely to lead to a significant curtailment of the impact
of preemption.
Total preemption was never a desirable policy standpoint. As the French
Cour d’Appel said in the French equivalent of Sidhu when rejecting the wide
view of the Convention’s preemptive reach, it did not wish to “consacre le
principe de l’irresponsabilité du transporteur aérien dan les situation non
prévues par cette Convention.”147
Specifically, the following legal position is suggested, which is that, taking
art.17(1) and art.29 together, the preemptive reach of Montreal does not touch
non-Convention passenger harm comprising:
a) plane-related non-accident and/or non-bodily injury harm; and
b) non-plane-related passenger harm.

147. (1997) 51 R.F.d.A.S. 155 at 160. Author’s translation—“the court did not wish to
approve of a principle of airline non-responsibility in situations not covered by the
Convention”.
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